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THE EFFECT OF MONOPSONY POWER IN MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
ON THE SALARIES OF PLAYERS WITH LESS THAN SIX YEARS 
IN THE MAJORS 
Andrew Tannan and Michael Seeborg* 
Economics Department, Illinois Wesleyan University 
This research attempts to measure the impact of monopsony power on baseball players 
with less than six years of experience. Past research indicates that players with less than 
six years of experience have lower salaries than players with the same productivity and 
more than six years of experience. To try and combat this monopsonistic behavior, 
baseball player' s fonned the Players' Union and instituted an arbitration process. 
Through this process, a third party arbitrator listens to cases from both a player and 
owner and then chooses one salary bid. While this process is intended to help players 
gain market power, it is still unclear whether the actual process is effective. Therefore, it 
is important to measure the impact of this monopsonistic market to see if further changes 
in the arbitration process need to be made. 
To do this, a case study of 1 9  outfielders who have filed for and received an arbitration 
hearing during the time frame of 1 990-2003 are examined following their career 
throughout their pre-arbitration (first three years), arbitration year (after third year), and 
post-arbitration years (after fourth year on). By using the human capital model, three 
ratios of the players' actual salaries during these years to a predicted free agent salary is 
developed. The prediction that the ratios should increase throughout these three periods, 
due to the fact that the players gain more market power, is supported in the results. In 
fact, the ratios increase from 0.27 in pre-arbitration years, to 0.97 in the arbitration year, 
to over 1 .2 in post-arbitration years. This indicates that the players face substantial 
monopsony power in the pre-arbitration year followed by a decrease in monopsony 
power through the arbitration process and post-arbitration years. 
